Kendra Lynn worked as an assembly line scanner for TNT at its Kansas City automobile parts warehouse. In August 2003, Michael Gill was hired as a supervisor for Lynn's shift. Beginning in October 2003, Gill made a number of sexually charged and otherwise inappropriate comments to Lynn. For example, when passing out paychecks, Gill told Lynn she was not going to get paid "until you bounce your ass." While passing her workstation, Gill commented on Lynn’s anatomy and made offensive remarks about his own anatomy and his plans for performing sex acts on her. Another supervisor witnessed Gill "dancing provocatively" behind Lynn while she worked at her station, and reported Gill's actions to a superior.
In late October 2003, in front of another supervisor, Gill hit Lynn on the buttocks with a belt and told her to "get your fat ass out of here." The supervisor who witnessed the incident reported it to his immediate superior, who later denied he was given the information.
Lynn complained about Gill's behavior to another shift supervisor. Her complaints were forwarded to the facility manager. When the facility manger failed to take any action, Lynn transferred to another shift to avoid Gill. After she was terminated, Lynn sued TNT alleging sexual harassment and wrongful termination. After a five day trial, the jury returned a verdict for Lynn on her sexual harassment claim and for TNT on her wrongful termination claim.
On appeal, TNT claimed that the jury's verdict should be "reversed outright" because Missouri law and federal anti-discrimination statutes are "not designed to purge the workplace of vulgarity" or "punish for boorish or even vulgar workplace conduct." TNT concluded that Lynn’s sexual harassment claim was of the type that should be "filtered out of the court system."
The Missouri Court of Appeals disagreed and found that Gill’s conduct went beyond the harmless comments or boorish conduct of a supervisor directed at a female employee. The court also noted that TNT seemingly disregarded its own egregious behavior in ignoring Gill’s behavior and doing absolutely nothing to curb or punish Gill’s conduct, even though TNT supervisors and others in TNT’s chain of command knew of the conduct.
With respect to damages, the appellate court affirmed the award of $50,000 in compensatory damages, plus interest, and reversed the trial court’s judgment reducing Lynn’s punitive damage award. Substituting its own award for that of the trial court, the appellate court held that if Lynn would agree to a reduction in the amount of punitive damages from $6.75 million to $3.75 million, the case would be remanded to the trial court for entry of a judgment in that amount, plus interest, on one-half that amount. Otherwise, the court held that the judgment for punitive damages would be reversed for a new trial.
Lynn v. TNT Logistics North America, Inc., Nos. WD 68096, WD 68135 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)
Monday, March 16, 2009
Monday, March 2, 2009
Missouri Supreme Court Finds in Favor of Employee in Sexual Harassment and Retaliation Case
Shortly after filing a charge of discrimination and receiving a “right to sue letter,” Cynthia Hill was reassigned to another job in Ford’s Hazelwood plant. In her new position, Ms. Hill was supervised by Ken Hune. Mr. Hune frequently asked Ms. Hill for details about her underwear and made sexually suggestive comments to her. Ms. Hill told Mr. Hune she was offended by his comments and asked him to stop.
Eventually, Ms. Hill and another female employee spoke with their group leader about Mr. Hune’s inappropriate behavior and sexually suggestive comments. The group leader took Ms. Hill’s concerns to Mr. Hune’s supervisor, Mr. Woods. Mr. Woods agreed to speak with Mr. Hune about the situation. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Woods and Mr. Hune had an argument that resulted in two union representatives and a labor relations supervisor, Paul Edds, convening a meeting to discuss the situation with Ms. Hill. By the time the meeting was over, Mr. Edds had ordered Ms. Hill not to return to work until she had gotten psychiatric help. Mr. Edds subsequently phoned Ms. Hill at home and suspended her for three days for “disrespecting” Mr. Hune during her argument with him. Mr. Hune was fired following an investigation by Mr. Edds into another female employee’s allegations of sexual harassment against him.
Ms. Hill filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC and MCHR against Ford alleging sexual harassment discrimination resulting in a hostile work environment and retaliation. However, Ms. Hill did not name Mr. Edds as a party to the charges she filed with either agency. Ms. Hill then sued Ford, Mr. Hune, and Mr. Edds. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Ford and Mr. Edds. Ms. Hill appealed.
Reversing the trial and appellate courts, the Missouri Supreme Court first noted that “. . . Missouri has adopted a different definition of ‘discrimination’ that in some respects offers greater protection to workers than does federal law.” Citing its earlier decision in Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814 (Mo. banc 2007), the Supreme Court also reaffirmed that nothing in the Missouri Human Rights Act required a plaintiff to prove that discrimination was a “substantial” or “determining” factor in the employment decision; rather, plaintiff need only show that some protected characteristic contributed to the unfair treatment.
Citing evidence adduced by Ms. Hill, the court concluded that “A reasonable fact-finder could accept Ms. Hill’s evidence and conclude that her referral for psychiatric treatment and her suspension constituted tangible employment actions that were caused or contributed to by the sexual harassment.” Likewise, with respect to her retaliation claim, the court found that “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to [Ms. Hill], Ms. Hill has adduced sufficient evidence that her rejection of and opposition to Mr. Hune’s sexual harassment was a contributing factor in her referral for psychiatric treatment and suspension.”
The court also rejected Mr. Edds’ argument that he could not be individually liable under the Missouri Human Rights Act. Citing two 2006 decisions from the Missouri Appellate Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, and the text of the statute itself, the court concluded that “The statute is clear that the MHRA is intended to reach not just the corporate or public employer but any person acting directly in the interest of the employer. A supervisory employee clearly falls into that category.”
Cynthia Hill v. Ford Motor Company, et al., No. SC 88981 (Mo. banc Feb. 24, 2009).
Eventually, Ms. Hill and another female employee spoke with their group leader about Mr. Hune’s inappropriate behavior and sexually suggestive comments. The group leader took Ms. Hill’s concerns to Mr. Hune’s supervisor, Mr. Woods. Mr. Woods agreed to speak with Mr. Hune about the situation. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Woods and Mr. Hune had an argument that resulted in two union representatives and a labor relations supervisor, Paul Edds, convening a meeting to discuss the situation with Ms. Hill. By the time the meeting was over, Mr. Edds had ordered Ms. Hill not to return to work until she had gotten psychiatric help. Mr. Edds subsequently phoned Ms. Hill at home and suspended her for three days for “disrespecting” Mr. Hune during her argument with him. Mr. Hune was fired following an investigation by Mr. Edds into another female employee’s allegations of sexual harassment against him.
Ms. Hill filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC and MCHR against Ford alleging sexual harassment discrimination resulting in a hostile work environment and retaliation. However, Ms. Hill did not name Mr. Edds as a party to the charges she filed with either agency. Ms. Hill then sued Ford, Mr. Hune, and Mr. Edds. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Ford and Mr. Edds. Ms. Hill appealed.
Reversing the trial and appellate courts, the Missouri Supreme Court first noted that “. . . Missouri has adopted a different definition of ‘discrimination’ that in some respects offers greater protection to workers than does federal law.” Citing its earlier decision in Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814 (Mo. banc 2007), the Supreme Court also reaffirmed that nothing in the Missouri Human Rights Act required a plaintiff to prove that discrimination was a “substantial” or “determining” factor in the employment decision; rather, plaintiff need only show that some protected characteristic contributed to the unfair treatment.
Citing evidence adduced by Ms. Hill, the court concluded that “A reasonable fact-finder could accept Ms. Hill’s evidence and conclude that her referral for psychiatric treatment and her suspension constituted tangible employment actions that were caused or contributed to by the sexual harassment.” Likewise, with respect to her retaliation claim, the court found that “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to [Ms. Hill], Ms. Hill has adduced sufficient evidence that her rejection of and opposition to Mr. Hune’s sexual harassment was a contributing factor in her referral for psychiatric treatment and suspension.”
The court also rejected Mr. Edds’ argument that he could not be individually liable under the Missouri Human Rights Act. Citing two 2006 decisions from the Missouri Appellate Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, and the text of the statute itself, the court concluded that “The statute is clear that the MHRA is intended to reach not just the corporate or public employer but any person acting directly in the interest of the employer. A supervisory employee clearly falls into that category.”
Cynthia Hill v. Ford Motor Company, et al., No. SC 88981 (Mo. banc Feb. 24, 2009).
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