Missouri Supreme Court Finds in Favor of Employee in Sexual Harassment and Retaliation Case

Shortly after filing a charge of discrimination and receiving a “right to sue letter,” Cynthia Hill was reassigned to another job in Ford’s Hazelwood plant. In her new position, Ms. Hill was supervised by Ken Hune. Mr. Hune frequently asked Ms. Hill for details about her underwear and made sexually suggestive comments to her. Ms. Hill told Mr. Hune she was offended by his comments and asked him to stop.

Eventually, Ms. Hill and another female employee spoke with their group leader about Mr. Hune’s inappropriate behavior and sexually suggestive comments. The group leader took Ms. Hill’s concerns to Mr. Hune’s supervisor, Mr. Woods. Mr. Woods agreed to speak with Mr. Hune about the situation. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Woods and Mr. Hune had an argument that resulted in two union representatives and a labor relations supervisor, Paul Edds, convening a meeting to discuss the situation with Ms. Hill. By the time the meeting was over, Mr. Edds had ordered Ms. Hill not to return to work until she had gotten psychiatric help. Mr. Edds subsequently phoned Ms. Hill at home and suspended her for three days for “disrespecting” Mr. Hune during her argument with him. Mr. Hune was fired following an investigation by Mr. Edds into another female employee’s allegations of sexual harassment against him.

Ms. Hill filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC and MCHR against Ford alleging sexual harassment discrimination resulting in a hostile work environment and retaliation. However, Ms. Hill did not name Mr. Edds as a party to the charges she filed with either agency. Ms. Hill then sued Ford, Mr. Hune, and Mr. Edds. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Ford and Mr. Edds. Ms. Hill appealed.

Reversing the trial and appellate courts, the Missouri Supreme Court first noted that “. . . Missouri has adopted a different definition of ‘discrimination’ that in some respects offers greater protection to workers than does federal law.” Citing its earlier decision in Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814 (Mo. banc 2007), the Supreme Court also reaffirmed that nothing in the Missouri Human Rights Act required a plaintiff to prove that discrimination was a “substantial” or “determining” factor in the employment decision; rather, plaintiff need only show that some protected characteristic contributed to the unfair treatment.

Citing evidence adduced by Ms. Hill, the court concluded that “A reasonable fact-finder could accept Ms. Hill’s evidence and conclude that her referral for psychiatric treatment and her suspension constituted tangible employment actions that were caused or contributed to by the sexual harassment.” Likewise, with respect to her retaliation claim, the court found that “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to [Ms. Hill], Ms. Hill has adduced sufficient evidence that her rejection of and opposition to Mr. Hune’s sexual harassment was a contributing factor in her referral for psychiatric treatment and suspension.”

The court also rejected Mr. Edds’ argument that he could not be individually liable under the Missouri Human Rights Act. Citing two 2006 decisions from the Missouri Appellate Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, and the text of the statute itself, the court concluded that “The statute is clear that the MHRA is intended to reach not just the corporate or public employer but any person acting directly in the interest of the employer. A supervisory employee clearly falls into that category.”

Cynthia Hill v. Ford Motor Company, et al., No. SC 88981 (Mo. banc Feb. 24, 2009).