Showing posts with label Missouri Human Rights Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Missouri Human Rights Act. Show all posts
Tuesday, January 8, 2013
A nurse at Springfield's Cox South hospital was terminated for refusing to wear a surgical mask because she did not get a flu shot. The nurse, who received a religious exemption from the flu shot, believs the mask requirement was imposed to punish those who refused the vaccine.
Read the complete article here.
Friday, December 2, 2011
Saturday, February 19, 2011
Reverse Race Discrimination Claim Fails Because Employee Voluntarily Resigned
Lonnie Dodge began his career with the City of Belton Police Department in 2001. Mr. Belton was arrested in 2007 for driving while intoxicated and eventually pled guilty to careless and imprudent driving. Mr. Dodge did not tell his supervisor of his arrest or conviction.
The Department discovered that Mr. Dodge had been arrested for DWI during a background check. Upon discovering this information, the Department gave Mr. Dodge a choice - resign or be terminated. Mr. Dodge refused to resign and was suspended with pay. However, shortly after submitting his resignation, Mr. Dodge attempted to rescind his resignation. The Department informed Mr. Dodge it had already accepted his resignation. Mr. Dodge claimed he resigned because the Department told him that, if he resigned, his police officer's license would not be revoked.
Mr. Dodge sued the City of Belton under the Missouri Human Rights Act and Title VII claiming he was terminated because of his race (white). Mr. Dodge alleged that an African-American employee also failed to report an arrest but was not terminated.
Granting the City's motion for summary judgment against Mr. Dodge, the court found that because Mr. Dodge had resigned and was not actually terminated, he was unable to show that he suffered an "adverse employment action." The court also noted that, because he resigned, the only way Mr. Dodge could have established an adverse employment action was to show that the City "constructively discharged him" by "deliberately creating intolerable working conditions with the intention of forcing [Mr. Dodge] to quit." Citing the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court concluded that "an employee's being told that he or she will be fired for cause does not, in and of itself, constitute constructive discharge."
Dodge v. City of Belton, Missouri, No. 10-0038-CV-W-ODS (W.D.Mo. Feb. 4, 2011).
The Department discovered that Mr. Dodge had been arrested for DWI during a background check. Upon discovering this information, the Department gave Mr. Dodge a choice - resign or be terminated. Mr. Dodge refused to resign and was suspended with pay. However, shortly after submitting his resignation, Mr. Dodge attempted to rescind his resignation. The Department informed Mr. Dodge it had already accepted his resignation. Mr. Dodge claimed he resigned because the Department told him that, if he resigned, his police officer's license would not be revoked.
Mr. Dodge sued the City of Belton under the Missouri Human Rights Act and Title VII claiming he was terminated because of his race (white). Mr. Dodge alleged that an African-American employee also failed to report an arrest but was not terminated.
Granting the City's motion for summary judgment against Mr. Dodge, the court found that because Mr. Dodge had resigned and was not actually terminated, he was unable to show that he suffered an "adverse employment action." The court also noted that, because he resigned, the only way Mr. Dodge could have established an adverse employment action was to show that the City "constructively discharged him" by "deliberately creating intolerable working conditions with the intention of forcing [Mr. Dodge] to quit." Citing the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court concluded that "an employee's being told that he or she will be fired for cause does not, in and of itself, constitute constructive discharge."
Dodge v. City of Belton, Missouri, No. 10-0038-CV-W-ODS (W.D.Mo. Feb. 4, 2011).
Wednesday, December 29, 2010
Court of Appeals Upholds Jury Verdict in Human Rights Act Age Discrimination Case
Glenda Claus started working as a room attendant at the Park Place Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri, in 1984. In 2006, the head of housekeeping promoted Ms. Claus to housekeeping supervisor. On December 7, 2007, Ms. Claus was fired. She was 63 years old at the time. Ms. Claus filed a Charge of Discrimination against her employer and supervisor with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights and, subsequently, filed suit claiming that the hotel and her supervisor discriminated against her based upon her age. Ms. Claus sought actual and punitive damages under the Missouri Human Rights Act.
A jury ultimately awarded Ms. Claus $50,000.00 in compensatory damages and $150,000.00 in punitive damages and the hotel appealed. Affirming the jury verdict, the reviewing court found that the jury could more than reasonably have rejected the hotel's claims that Ms. Claus was fired for performance deficiencies given (1) the hotel's failure to allege any performance deficiencies until after Ms. Claus filed her discrimination claim, (2) Ms. Claus' record of positive job performance evaluations and lack of "write-ups," and (3) the hotel's failure to warn Ms. Claus about deficiencies in her performance despite regularly "writing-up" other employees. The court was particularly troubled that the retained house keeping supervisor, who was in her thirties, had been written up multiple times for excessive absences.
Regarding the punitive damages award, the reviewing court noted that the jury had before it evidence that Ms. Claus' supervisor had an extensive knowledge of employment law and had engaged in consulting work in human resources. The supervisor also had also trained small to medium sized businesses in employment law and assisted other employers with drafting their antidiscrimination policies. Moreover, Ms. Claus' supervisor and the hotel's owner both testified that they knew it was against the law to fire an employee because of an employee's age.
Finally, the appellate court determined that Ms. Claus was entitled to an award of attorney's fees under the Missouri Human Rights Act and remanded the case to the trial court for an award of fees and costs.
Claus v. Intrigue Hotels, LLC, No. WD 71927 (W.D.Mo. Dec. 28, 2010).
A jury ultimately awarded Ms. Claus $50,000.00 in compensatory damages and $150,000.00 in punitive damages and the hotel appealed. Affirming the jury verdict, the reviewing court found that the jury could more than reasonably have rejected the hotel's claims that Ms. Claus was fired for performance deficiencies given (1) the hotel's failure to allege any performance deficiencies until after Ms. Claus filed her discrimination claim, (2) Ms. Claus' record of positive job performance evaluations and lack of "write-ups," and (3) the hotel's failure to warn Ms. Claus about deficiencies in her performance despite regularly "writing-up" other employees. The court was particularly troubled that the retained house keeping supervisor, who was in her thirties, had been written up multiple times for excessive absences.
Regarding the punitive damages award, the reviewing court noted that the jury had before it evidence that Ms. Claus' supervisor had an extensive knowledge of employment law and had engaged in consulting work in human resources. The supervisor also had also trained small to medium sized businesses in employment law and assisted other employers with drafting their antidiscrimination policies. Moreover, Ms. Claus' supervisor and the hotel's owner both testified that they knew it was against the law to fire an employee because of an employee's age.
Finally, the appellate court determined that Ms. Claus was entitled to an award of attorney's fees under the Missouri Human Rights Act and remanded the case to the trial court for an award of fees and costs.
Claus v. Intrigue Hotels, LLC, No. WD 71927 (W.D.Mo. Dec. 28, 2010).
Wednesday, December 22, 2010
City not Entitled to Offset for Work. Comp. Benefits Paid to Former Employee
Alonzo Echols was fired by the City of Riverside in October of 2007. Mr. Echols claimed his discharge was in retaliation for a complaint of discrimination he made to the Missouri Human Rights Commission. A jury found that the City did retaliate against Mr. Echols and awarded him $463.00, which amounted to one week's salary.
The City then sought to offset the $463.00 verdict by the amount of unemployment benefits already paid to Mr. Echols. At a subsequent hearing, the trial court denied the City's request to amend its answer to add the affirmative defense of offset for unemployment benefits paid to Mr. Echols but nevertheless reduced Mr. Echols' award by the amount of unemployment benefits he had already received which reduced his actual damages verdict to zero.
On appeal, Mr. Echols argued that the trial court erred in reducing his $463.00 verdict to zero using unemployment benefits received as an offset because an offset is an affirmative defense that was waived by the City because it was not pled. The reviewing court agreed and further held that even if the affirmative defense of offset had been properly pled unemployment benefits received should not serve to mitigate a jury award for back pay where the employer is being punished for illegal conduct.
Echols v. The City of Riverside, No. WD 71560 (W.D.Mo. Dec. 21, 2010).
The City then sought to offset the $463.00 verdict by the amount of unemployment benefits already paid to Mr. Echols. At a subsequent hearing, the trial court denied the City's request to amend its answer to add the affirmative defense of offset for unemployment benefits paid to Mr. Echols but nevertheless reduced Mr. Echols' award by the amount of unemployment benefits he had already received which reduced his actual damages verdict to zero.
On appeal, Mr. Echols argued that the trial court erred in reducing his $463.00 verdict to zero using unemployment benefits received as an offset because an offset is an affirmative defense that was waived by the City because it was not pled. The reviewing court agreed and further held that even if the affirmative defense of offset had been properly pled unemployment benefits received should not serve to mitigate a jury award for back pay where the employer is being punished for illegal conduct.
Echols v. The City of Riverside, No. WD 71560 (W.D.Mo. Dec. 21, 2010).
Monday, March 16, 2009
Plaintiff in Sexual Harassment Case Entitled to $3.75 Million in Punitive Damages
Kendra Lynn worked as an assembly line scanner for TNT at its Kansas City automobile parts warehouse. In August 2003, Michael Gill was hired as a supervisor for Lynn's shift. Beginning in October 2003, Gill made a number of sexually charged and otherwise inappropriate comments to Lynn. For example, when passing out paychecks, Gill told Lynn she was not going to get paid "until you bounce your ass." While passing her workstation, Gill commented on Lynn’s anatomy and made offensive remarks about his own anatomy and his plans for performing sex acts on her. Another supervisor witnessed Gill "dancing provocatively" behind Lynn while she worked at her station, and reported Gill's actions to a superior.
In late October 2003, in front of another supervisor, Gill hit Lynn on the buttocks with a belt and told her to "get your fat ass out of here." The supervisor who witnessed the incident reported it to his immediate superior, who later denied he was given the information.
Lynn complained about Gill's behavior to another shift supervisor. Her complaints were forwarded to the facility manager. When the facility manger failed to take any action, Lynn transferred to another shift to avoid Gill. After she was terminated, Lynn sued TNT alleging sexual harassment and wrongful termination. After a five day trial, the jury returned a verdict for Lynn on her sexual harassment claim and for TNT on her wrongful termination claim.
On appeal, TNT claimed that the jury's verdict should be "reversed outright" because Missouri law and federal anti-discrimination statutes are "not designed to purge the workplace of vulgarity" or "punish for boorish or even vulgar workplace conduct." TNT concluded that Lynn’s sexual harassment claim was of the type that should be "filtered out of the court system."
The Missouri Court of Appeals disagreed and found that Gill’s conduct went beyond the harmless comments or boorish conduct of a supervisor directed at a female employee. The court also noted that TNT seemingly disregarded its own egregious behavior in ignoring Gill’s behavior and doing absolutely nothing to curb or punish Gill’s conduct, even though TNT supervisors and others in TNT’s chain of command knew of the conduct.
With respect to damages, the appellate court affirmed the award of $50,000 in compensatory damages, plus interest, and reversed the trial court’s judgment reducing Lynn’s punitive damage award. Substituting its own award for that of the trial court, the appellate court held that if Lynn would agree to a reduction in the amount of punitive damages from $6.75 million to $3.75 million, the case would be remanded to the trial court for entry of a judgment in that amount, plus interest, on one-half that amount. Otherwise, the court held that the judgment for punitive damages would be reversed for a new trial.
Lynn v. TNT Logistics North America, Inc., Nos. WD 68096, WD 68135 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)
In late October 2003, in front of another supervisor, Gill hit Lynn on the buttocks with a belt and told her to "get your fat ass out of here." The supervisor who witnessed the incident reported it to his immediate superior, who later denied he was given the information.
Lynn complained about Gill's behavior to another shift supervisor. Her complaints were forwarded to the facility manager. When the facility manger failed to take any action, Lynn transferred to another shift to avoid Gill. After she was terminated, Lynn sued TNT alleging sexual harassment and wrongful termination. After a five day trial, the jury returned a verdict for Lynn on her sexual harassment claim and for TNT on her wrongful termination claim.
On appeal, TNT claimed that the jury's verdict should be "reversed outright" because Missouri law and federal anti-discrimination statutes are "not designed to purge the workplace of vulgarity" or "punish for boorish or even vulgar workplace conduct." TNT concluded that Lynn’s sexual harassment claim was of the type that should be "filtered out of the court system."
The Missouri Court of Appeals disagreed and found that Gill’s conduct went beyond the harmless comments or boorish conduct of a supervisor directed at a female employee. The court also noted that TNT seemingly disregarded its own egregious behavior in ignoring Gill’s behavior and doing absolutely nothing to curb or punish Gill’s conduct, even though TNT supervisors and others in TNT’s chain of command knew of the conduct.
With respect to damages, the appellate court affirmed the award of $50,000 in compensatory damages, plus interest, and reversed the trial court’s judgment reducing Lynn’s punitive damage award. Substituting its own award for that of the trial court, the appellate court held that if Lynn would agree to a reduction in the amount of punitive damages from $6.75 million to $3.75 million, the case would be remanded to the trial court for entry of a judgment in that amount, plus interest, on one-half that amount. Otherwise, the court held that the judgment for punitive damages would be reversed for a new trial.
Lynn v. TNT Logistics North America, Inc., Nos. WD 68096, WD 68135 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)
Monday, January 26, 2009
Hostile Work Environment Not Necessarily Actionable Under Missouri Human Rights Act
In Gilliland v. Missouri Athletic Club, the Supreme Court of Missouri recently held that a hostile work environment is not actionable under the Missouri Human Rights Act unless the hostility is directed at the victim because of his or her race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age or disability.
The plaintiff in the case, Tracy Gilliland, sued the Missouri Athletic Club for sexual harassment, race discrimination, and constructive discharge among other things. At trial, the jury found in favor of Mr. Gilliland on his constructive discharge claim and found the club liable for punitive damages. The jury rejected Mr. Gilliland's claims of race and sex discrimination. Mr. Gilliland appealed.
Affirming the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court concluded that the jury's rejection of Mr. Gilliland's race and sex discrimination claims - and the fact that his jury instruction on constructive discharge made no mention of any category protected by the human rights act or other public policy - was fatal to his appeal.
For additional background on the case, see Kristen Hinman, "Taking it to the MAC," Riverfront Times, January 12, 2005, which was published while the case was pending.
The plaintiff in the case, Tracy Gilliland, sued the Missouri Athletic Club for sexual harassment, race discrimination, and constructive discharge among other things. At trial, the jury found in favor of Mr. Gilliland on his constructive discharge claim and found the club liable for punitive damages. The jury rejected Mr. Gilliland's claims of race and sex discrimination. Mr. Gilliland appealed.
Affirming the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court concluded that the jury's rejection of Mr. Gilliland's race and sex discrimination claims - and the fact that his jury instruction on constructive discharge made no mention of any category protected by the human rights act or other public policy - was fatal to his appeal.
For additional background on the case, see Kristen Hinman, "Taking it to the MAC," Riverfront Times, January 12, 2005, which was published while the case was pending.
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