Former Particle Dynamics Supervisor Alleges Age Discrimination and Retaliation

Read Jim Doyle's complete article at stltoday.com

FBI Says St. Louis Employee Seemed Ideal But Wasn't Working

Read Robert Patrick's complete article at stltoday.com

Wage Gap Between Men and Women Widening in Missouri and Illinois According to New BLS Data

Read Jim Gallagher's complete article at stltoday.com

Reverse Race Discrimination Claim Fails Because Employee Voluntarily Resigned

Lonnie Dodge began his career with the City of Belton Police Department in 2001. Mr. Belton was arrested in 2007 for driving while intoxicated and eventually pled guilty to careless and imprudent driving. Mr. Dodge did not tell his supervisor of his arrest or conviction.

The Department discovered that Mr. Dodge had been arrested for DWI during a background check. Upon discovering this information, the Department gave Mr. Dodge a choice - resign or be terminated. Mr. Dodge refused to resign and was suspended with pay. However, shortly after submitting his resignation, Mr. Dodge attempted to rescind his resignation. The Department informed Mr. Dodge it had already accepted his resignation. Mr. Dodge claimed he resigned because the Department told him that, if he resigned, his police officer's license would not be revoked.

Mr. Dodge sued the City of Belton under the Missouri Human Rights Act and Title VII claiming he was terminated because of his race (white). Mr. Dodge alleged that an African-American employee also failed to report an arrest but was not terminated.

Granting the City's motion for summary judgment against Mr. Dodge, the court found that because Mr. Dodge had resigned and was not actually terminated, he was unable to show that he suffered an "adverse employment action." The court also noted that, because he resigned, the only way Mr. Dodge could have established an adverse employment action was to show that the City "constructively discharged him" by "deliberately creating intolerable working conditions with the intention of forcing [Mr. Dodge] to quit." Citing the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court concluded that "an employee's being told that he or she will be fired for cause does not, in and of itself, constitute constructive discharge."

Dodge v. City of Belton, Missouri, No. 10-0038-CV-W-ODS (W.D.Mo. Feb. 4, 2011).

U.S. Supreme Court Holds Adverse Action Against a Close Family Member of a Complainant Emloyee May Now Constitute Illegal Retaliation

The United States Supreme Court recently held in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, No. 09-291 (U.S. Jan. 24, 2011) that taking an adverse employment action against a close family member of an employee may constitute illegal retaliation.

This decision follows a recent trend of Supreme Court decisions expanding the scope of protection for employees in retaliation cases. The Court's conclusion that "close family members" may raise claims of their own, while "mere acquaintances" may not leaves a lot of room for disagreement over who can qualify as a "close family member" and will likely become the subject of significant litigation.

Eighth Circuit Finds Employee's Lawsuit Failed to Allege Actionable FLSA Retaliation

Lisa Ritchie filed a lawsuit against her former employer, St. Louis Jewish Light, and Larry Levin, her former supervisor under the Fair Labor Standards Act claiming that her employment was terminated in retaliation for insisting on recording her overtime work. Jewish Light and Levin filed a motion to dismiss arguing that informal complaints about overtime to a supervisor do not constitute “protected activity” under the FLSA. The trial court agreed and dismissed Ms. Ritchie’s complaint.

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit declined to decide whether informal complaints could, in fact, constitute “protected activity” under the FLSA finding instead that Ms. Ritchie’s complaint actually failed to allege that Ritchie made any sort of complaint to either Levin or St. Louis Jewish Light. Instead, the court found that “ the only complaining asserted in her pleading goes the other way--Levin complaining to Ritchie.” Concluding that “[R]ather than constituting an affirmative complaint that would trigger the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, [Ms. Ritchie’s] recording of overtime could be nothing more than mere insubordination, she having been instructed to the contrary . . . Insubordination is not protected under the FLSA,” the court affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The court further noted that “. . . if merely recording one's overtime is a ‘complaint’ that triggers the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, an employer would not be able to discipline an employee for working unauthorized overtime so long as the employee recorded the overtime.”

Ritchie v. St. Louis Jewish Light, No. 10-1356 (8th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011).

Allegations in Lawsuit Must be "Reasonably Related" to Allegations in Charge of Discrimination to Survive Motion to Dismiss

Joseph Abellard filed a charge of discrimination against Boeing, his employer, with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights and EEOC on June 15, 2008. The charge alleged discrimination on the bases of race, age and disability. Plaintiff's charge read as follows:

I was hired by [Boeing] in November 1995. My last position held was Engineer Specialist/Sr. Engineer. In December 2007 I went on medical leave. I returned to work on March 5, 2008. I worked through March 7, 2008 but was informed that I had not provided the required documents for a release to return to work. I provided the employer with a release to return to work from my Psychiatrist. I was told I had to get another release from my primary doctor. I provided all of the required documents as instructed. Around March 26, 2008 I received a termination letter stating that I was terminated for being on leave illegally. I believe that I have been discriminated against due to a record of and/or perceived disability. I also believe that I have been discriminated against due to my race (African American) and age (52). This is in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.

Sometime thereafter, Mr. Abellard filed suit against Boeing alleging harassment, retaliation, failure to transfer, failure to accommodate, and being subjected to different terms and conditions of employment. Boeing filed a motion to dismiss arguing that these allegations were outside the scope of Mr. Abellard's charge of discrimination and therefore must be dismissed. The trial court agreed and dismissed these allegations finding that the allegations were not "reasonably related" to Mr. Abellard's charge and that Mr. Abellard had therefore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Abellard v. Boeing, No. 4:10CV724 JCH (E.D.Mo. 2010).